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Fair and equitable benefit-sharing is a diffuse legal phenomenon in international law 
that has elicited little investigation with regard to its nature, extent and implications. It 
has been mostly studied as the cornerstone of the international legal regime on 
bioprospecting (research and innovation based on genetic resources).1 But, under the 
radar, a growing number of international legal materials refer to "benefit-sharing" 
with regard to natural resource use (extractive activities, 2  forest 3  and water 4 
management, tourism,5 the use of marine resources,6 land use and food production),7 
environmental protection (biodiversity conservation8  and the fight against climate 
change9), and the use of knowledge.10  Concrete benefits to be shared have been 
identified as both monetary and non-monetary ones, such as revenue, information, 
                                                        
1 Such an "international regime" has been identified as comprising: Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR), and the Bonn Guidelines on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization (CBD Decision X/1 (2010), preambular para 6). Specialist legal scholarship is abundant: eg, 
EC Kamau and G Winter, eds, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law: Solutions for 
Access and Benefit Sharing (2009); Singh Nijar³7UDGLWLRQDO.QRZOHGJH6\VWHPV,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
DQG1DWLRQDO&KDOOHQJHV0DUJLQDOL]DWLRQRU(PDQFLSDWLRQ"´EJIL (2013) 1205. 
2 Eg Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (judgment on 
preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), 28 November 2007, para 138; 2012 Expert 
Mechanism: Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making 
with a focus on extractive industries (UN Doc A/HRC/21/52, 2012). For further examples of 
international materials referring to benefit-sharing in this and other contexts, see 
http://www.benelex.ed.ac.uk/mind_maps.  
3 Eg. Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests (1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), para. 12(d). 
4 Eg Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Resolution X.19 'Wetlands and 
river basin management: consolidated scientific and technical guidance' (2008), Annex, para 25. 
5 Eg CBD Decision V/25 Biodiversity and tourism (2000), paras 4(b) and (d). 
6 Eg, UNCLOS arts. 82.4 and 140.2; and FAO, 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(VGGT), Article 8.6. 
7 Eg UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food, "Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: a set of minimum 
principles and measures to address the human rights challenge" (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.2, 
para 33. 
8 Eg $IULFDQ&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQDQG3HRSOHV¶5LJKWVCentre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 
Comm. no 276/2003 (25 November 2009) para 274. 
9 Eg 2012 UN-REDD Programme Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, criterion 12; 2013 
Adaptation Fund Environmental and Social Policy, para 13. 
10 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 1948, Art. 
27(1); CBD Article 8(j); Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(5) and 8(a). 
  
scientific and commercial cooperation, joint management of natural resources, and 
technical support.  
 
Both from a policy- and law-making perspective, the proliferation of references to 
benefit-sharing has been accompanied by a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity, to 
the point that it has been rightly asked whether there is just one concept of benefit-
sharing or many.11  Benefit-sharing is employed in international law to connote a 
treaty objective, 12  an international obligation, 13  a right, 14  a safeguard 15  or a 
mechanism. 16  But, there is no instance in which it has been unequivocally 
understood,17 fully developed18 or become satisfactorily operational.19  
 
In addition, benefit-sharing is applied to relations that have different relevance under 
international law and are characterized by different de facto power asymmetries. It 
applies among countries, whose relationship is characterized by sovereign equality 
and, in key areas of international cooperation, by the controversial principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility. 20  It also applies to relations between a 
government and a community within its territory, whose relationship is characterized 
by the State's sovereign powers and international obligations over natural resources 
and the relevance, to different extents, of international human rights law. For the 
purposes of conceptual clarity, therefore, a distinction needs to be drawn between 
benefit-sharing among States (inter-State benefit-sharing) and benefit-sharing within 
States (intra-State, between governments and communities).21 Furthermore, benefit-
sharing applies to relations between communities and private companies 22 that may 
be protected by international investment law and that, even when that is not the case, 
are increasingly understood in the light of business responsibility to respect human 
                                                        
11 'H-RQJHµ:KDWLV)DLUDQG(TXLWDEOH%HQHILW-VKDULQJ"¶ Journal of Agricultural & 
Environmental Ethics (2011) 127; and Schroeder, 'Benefit-VKDULQJ,W¶V7LPHIRUD'HILQLWLRQ

Journal of Medical Ethics (2007) 205, at 208. 
12 CBD Article 1; ITPGR Article 1; Nagoya Protocol Article 1. 
13 CBD Article 15(7) and 8(j); Nagoya Protocol Article 5. 
14 ILO Convention No 169, Article 15(2); ITPGR, Article 9. 
15 Saramaka (n 2) para 129; Endorois (n 8) para 227; Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, Study 
on extractive industries and indigenous peoples (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, para 52. 
16 UNCLOS, Article 140; ITPGR Article 10; Nagoya Protocol Article 10. 
17 See interpretative divergences and ongoing negotiations under the Nagoya Protocol discussed in E 
Morgera, E Tsioumani and M Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya Protocol: Commentary on the Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2014). 
18 Eg 'Towards the development of a regulatory framework for polymetallic nodule exploitation in the 
Area' (2013) UN Doc ISBA/19/C/5. 
19 An intersessional process is currently underway on enhancing the functioning of the ITPGR 
Multilateral System: ITPGR Resolution 2/2013.  
20 Eg, L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (2006), and Hey, 
µ&RPPRQEXW'LIIHUHQWLDWHG5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶LQR. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online 2010). 
21 Morgera and Tsioumani, 'The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversit\DQG&RPPXQLWLHV¶
Livelihoods' 19 RECIEL (2010) 150. 
22 International Finance Corporation (IFC), Performance Standard 7 (2012), paras. 18-20; FAO, IFAD, 
UNCTAD and the World Bank, Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects 
Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI), principle 6; UN Global Compact Office, 'Business 
Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2013), at 76-77; Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People' Rights (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, paras 73-75.  
  
rights. 23  Finally, benefit-sharing applies to relations within communities (intra-
community), 24  which raises questions of the interaction among communities' 
customary laws, and national and international law.25  These occurrences point to 
another overlooked conceptual distinction: transnational traits can be identified in the 
inter-State and intra-State dimensions of benefit-sharing, as well as in the intra-
community (particularly when international development assistance is involved).  
 
This proliferation may be explained by the intuitive appeal of benefit-sharing as a 
frame, to borrow a term from communication, sociological and political sciences.26 It 
emphasizes the advantages (the positive outcomes or implications) of tackling 
challenges in bioprospecting, natural resource use and knowledge production so as to 
help motivate participation by different stakeholders. As Nollkaemper has aptly 
explained, frames 'play an essential, though not always recognized, role in the 
development of international law': frames select and accentuate certain aspects of 
reality over others to promote a particular problem definition or approach to its 
solution, they are chosen and strategically used by actors with particular agendas and 
powers, and 'have distinct normative and regulatory implications.' 27  As a frame, 
benefit-sharing holds the promise to facilitate agreement upon specific forms of 
cooperation, as different parties are being motivated by their perception of the 
benefits that would derive from it.28  
 
On the other hand, fragmented, but growing empirical evidence indicates that in 
practice benefit-sharing rarely achieves its stated objectives, and may actually end up 
working against its purposes. On the ground, benefit-sharing has been seen as a 
'disingenuous win-win rhetoric' that leads to loss of control and access over resources 
by the vulnerable through 'narrative framings of the global public good' and 
'dominating knowledge approaches.'29 This body of work, in other words, points to 
the critical weight that power asymmetries have in all the relations to which benefit-
sharing applies. This literature, however, does not engage in a systematic reflection on 
the opportunities and limitations of international law to prevent, address and remedy 
the injustices that may be brought about in the name of benefit-sharing. 30  The 
implication is that as an aspirational and optimistic frame, benefit-sharing remains to 
be assessed from a healthily skeptical and legally robust perspective.  
                                                        
23 UNHRC, 'Protect, respect and remedy, a Framework for Business and Human Rights' (2008) UN 
Doc A/HRC/8/5, endorsed by A/HRC/RES/8/7 (2008); UNHRC, 'Guiding principles on business and 
KXPDQULJKWVLPSOHPHQWLQJWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV³3URWHFW5HVSHFWDQG5HPHG\´)UDPHZRUN

UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, endorsed by Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4 (2011). 
24 This is intra-community benefit-sharing: eg PRAI, principle 6; Committee on Food Security, 
Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (2014), para. 23, iv.  
25 Eg Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). 
26 Parks and Morgera, 'Understanding the Normative Diffusion of Benefit-sharing: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach' forthcoming in Global Environmental Politics. 
27 Nollkaemper, 'Framing Elephant Extinction' (2014) 3 ESIL blogpost. 
28 Sadoff and Grey, 'Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and Sharing 
Benefits' 30 Water International (2005) 420, at 420 (emphasis added). 
29 Martin et al, 'Just Conservation? On the Fairness of Sharing Benefits' in T. Sikor (ed), The Justices 
and Injustices of Ecosystem Services (2014) 69, at 84-88. 
30 Eg Wynberg and Hauck, 'People, Power, and the Coast: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding 
and Implementing Benefit Sharing' 19 Ecology and Society (2014) 27; and Van Wyk, Breen and 
Freimund, 'Meanings and Robustness: Propositions for Enhancing Benefit Sharing in Social-Ecological 
Systems' 8 International Journal of the Commons (2014) 576. 
  
 
Against this background, this article aims to develop a concept of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing deriving from international environmental law, international human 
rights law and the law of the sea, with a view to shifting the investigation from current 
sectoral/technical approaches to the perspective of general international law, and 
possibly contribute to research in other areas such as international health 31  and 
economic32 law. The concept will serve to identify normative elements that are shared 
among different treaties and other international legal instruments, based on the 
understanding that international law is often developed by building in an iterative 
process on previously agreed language. 33  Identifying a common core to fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing in international law will serve the purposes of comparison 
and generalization.34 But it is not intended to provide a holistic or exhaustive notion 
of benefit-sharing: rather it will allow to appreciate variations and continuous 
evolution across regimes with different purposes, standards of protection and 
interpretative approaches.  
 
Different historic matrices behind the proliferation of references to benefit-sharing in 
international law will be identified first, with a view to explaining the methodological 
and substantive premises of the enquiry. On these bases, an international legal 
concept of benefit-sharing will be proposed, comprising the following elements: the 
act of sharing; the nature of the benefits to be shared; the activities from which 
benefit-sharing arise; and the beneficiaries. The connection between benefit-sharing 
and equity will be explored last, with the latter providing the rationale for benefit-
sharing in international law. The conclusions will develop a research agenda on the 
basis of the proposed conceptualization.   
 
 
1. Historic matrices 
 
No legal history of benefit-sharing in international law has been drawn yet. The 
earliest textual reference to benefit-sharing can likely be found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (the right of everyone to share in the benefits of 
scientific advancements as part of the human right to science). 35  Its normative 
content, however, has not yet been clarified through national or international 
                                                        
31 There is already a body of research on benefit-sharing in this area, but with limited engagement with 
other areas of international law: Wilke, 'A Healthy Look at the Nagoya Protocol - Implications for 
Global Health Governance' in E Morgera, M Buck and E Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation 
Challenges (2013) 123. 
32 There appears to be no literature examining the impact (or lack thereof) on international economic 
law of the exhortations of the UN General Assembly to sharing the benefits of globalization (eg, 
Resolution 63/230 Second UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2008-2017), para 12) or earlier 
references to benefit-sharing in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Resolution 
29/3281 (1974), Art. 10. 
33 McLachlan, 'The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention' 54 
ICLQ (2005) 279, at 284. 
34 In the tradition of analytical jurisprudence, as defined by Twining, 'Law, Justice and Rights: Some 
implications of a global perspective' in J Ebbeson and P Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice 
in Context (2009) 76, at 80-82. 
35 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), 1948 Article 27.1 
  
practice. 36  Instead, benefit-sharing appears to have found more fertile normative 
ground in connection with natural resources. In this section, it is argued that benefit-
sharing developed in international law first under the umbrella of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) and its legacy for the global sustainable 
development agenda, and more recently under the discourse on ecosystem services. 
 
The NIEO can be described as newly independent developing countries' attempt in the 
1970s at radically restructuring the global economic system by prioritizing the 
objective of development as part of the decolonization process.37 The NIEO provided 
the context for the development of the concept of national sovereignty over natural 
resources to support the self-determination of States and of peoples to decide about 
the economic, social and cultural aspects of human development.38 In both cases, the 
NIEO called for international cooperation on the basis of need and for shifting away 
from legal techniques that serve to perpetrate economic domination by a minority of 
States. 39  Against this background, benefit-sharing has been linked to the still 
controversial notion of a human right to development, 40  and to the rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples to their lands and natural resources.41 In addition, it has 
been encapsulated in the innovative construct of the common heritage of mankind 
with regards to the Moon42 and deep sea-bed minerals,43 to prevent few States from 
appropriating resources beyond the reach of those with fewer technological and 
financial capacities.  
 
Since then, the NIEO has formally disappeared from the international agenda, its 
project of overhauling the international economic order having been abandoned 
following the creation of the World Trade Organization.44  But the discourses on 
equitable globalization and the principle of sustainable development have been seen 
DV µGLUHFW UHPLQGHUV¶ RI WKH 1,(2
V FDOO IRU HTXLW\ among States45 and for a rights-
based approach to development.46 To a still significant extent, the NIEO has thus 
evolved into a general approach to the making of international environmental law 
                                                        
36 Schabas, 'Study of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific and Technological Progress and its 
Applications" in Y Donders and V Volodin (eds), Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: 
Legal Developments and Challenges (2007) 273; Chapman, 'Towards an Understanding of the Right to 
Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Application' 8 Journal of Human Rights (2009) 1; 
Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/26; and M Mancisidor, 'Is There 
such a Thing as a Human Right to Science in International Law?' ESIL Reflections (7 April 2015). 
37 81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\5HVROXWLRQVRIµ'HFODUDWLRQRQWKH(VWDEOLVKPHQWRID1HZ
,QWHUQDWLRQDO(FRQRPLF2UGHU¶DQGRIµ3URJUDPPHRI$FWLRQIRUWKH(VWDEOLVKPHQWRID
New InternatioQDO(FRQRPLF2UGHU¶ 
38 6DOPRQµ)URP1,(2WR1RZDQGWKH8QILQLVKDEOH6WRU\RI(FRQRPLF-XVWLFH¶ICLQ (2013) 31. 
39 C. Rossi, Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to International Decision-making 
(1993), at 200-201. 
40 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 2.3. 
41 ILO Convention No 169, Art. 15.2. 
42 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art 11(7). 
43 UNCLOS art.140. 
44 Francioni, 'Equity' in Wolfrum (n 20), para 21. 
45  E. Tourme-Jouannet, What is a Fair International Society? International Law between Development 
and Recognition (2013), at 86-87 and 37. 
46 Salmon (n 38), at 49. 
  
aimed at solidarity and cooperation to the benefit of the least favored countries.47 And 
it has been enriched by the recognition of cultural diversity among and within States, 
resulting in protection of the rights of marginalized individuals and communities over 
natural resources in order to protect their cultural identity and livelihoods. 48 As a 
result, national sovereignty over natural resources has been progressively qualified by 
duties and responsibilities towards other States and towards communities49 (including 
communities outside States' own borders 50 ), and redefined as a commitment to 
cooperate for the good of the international community at large in terms of equity and 
sustainability.51 This evolution provides the background for the references to both 
inter-State and intra-State benefit-sharing in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGR) and the Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing to the CBD (Nagoya 
Protocol).  
 
The more recent spread of benefit-sharing in the areas of water, land and climate 
change has in turn been attributed52 to the discourse on ecosystem services - the 
multiple ways in which ecosystems contribute to human well-being.53 Having gained 
global scientific and political traction in the lead up to the 2005 UN Summit,54 this 
discourse has served to emphasize the largely unaccounted merit of ecosystem service 
providers55 and the devastating impacts of ecosystems' decline on the vulnerable. The 
discourse clearly starts from an economic perspective, to develop the argument that an 
economic valuation of ecosystems serves to prevent more easily monetized objectives 
from taking priority in decision-making56  and that ecosystem stewards should be 
rewarded (including through payments for ecosystem services) for contributing to 
human wellbeing. While ecosystem stewards may often be vulnerable, being the most 
exposed to unsustainable and inequitable environmental management decisions and 
practices,57 this is not always the case and the notion of ecosystem services does not 
necessarily aim to protect the vulnerable.58 Legal scholars has therefore focused on 
the moral and cultural acceptability, and the social and environmental effectiveness, 
of pricing and marketing ecosystem services, 59  with the limitations of purely 
                                                        
47 Eg Maljean-Dubois, 'Justice et société internationale: l'équité dans le droit international de 
l'environnement' in A. Michelot (ed), Equité et environnement (2012), 355, at 258-9. 
48 Tourme-Jouannet (n 45), at 121 and 149. 
49 Lenzerini, 'Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples' 
42 Texas International Law Journal (2006) 155. 
50 Benvenisti, 'Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of State to Foreign 
Stakeholders' 107 AJIL (2013) 295. 
51 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C, Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (2009), at 192. 
52 Eg, Nkhata et al, 'A Typology of Benefit Sharing Arrangements for the Governance of Social-
Ecological Systems in Developing Countries' 17 Ecology and Society (2012) 1. 
53 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: www.millenniumassessment.org/en/index.aspx. 
54 Morgera, 'The 2005 UN World Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full Glass' 15 
Italian Yearbook of International Law (2006) 53. 
55 Sikor et al, 'Toward an Empirical Analysis of Justice in Ecosystem Governance' (2014) Conservation 
Letters doi: 10.1111/conl.12142, at 4. 
56 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), Challenges and Responses (2014).  
57 UN General Assembly Strategic Framework for the period 2012-2013, UN Doc A/65/6/Rev.1 
(2011), para 11(24)(b) and for the period 2014-2015, UN Doc A/67/6 (prog 11) (2012), para 11(16). 
58 See generally Sikor (n 39). 
59 Eg Reid and Nsoh, 'Whose Ecosystem is it Anyway? Private and Public Rights under New 
Approaches to Biodiversity Conservation' 5 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment (2014) 112. 
  
monetary valuation being openly acknowledged in the discourse.60 Whether or not 
ecosystem services can be fully or solely responsible for the diffusion of benefit-
sharing, they raise conceptual questions that find clear correspondence in the debate 
on benefit-sharing as a 'post-neoliberal attempt to harness market-based activities ... to 
social and environmental ends'61  or a preference for solutions based on financial 
transactions that may ignore or even reinforce injustices.62 Other questions, however, 
related to ecosystem services from an international legal perspective have not yet 
been tackled in the literature - namely whether and to what extent ecosystem services 
contribute to an evolutive interpretation of human well-being63 as the objective of 
international economic and social cooperation under the UN Charter,64 of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources,65 and of the human right to a decent standard of 
living.66 These inter-linked notions will be relied upon in conceptualizing benefit-
sharing in the following sections. 
 
 
2. Premises  
 
Short of a legal history of benefit-sharing, it is proposed, following Neil Walker's 
reflection on global law, to conceptualize benefit-sharing by identifying µheavily 
overlapping, mutually connected and openly extended' patterns of normative 
development through a selective reading of the sources of international law, their 
areas of impact and perceived limits.67 This approach appears particularly fitting as 
iterative, reflexive and decentralized approaches are increasingly relied upon in the 
further development and implementation of international law. 68  The present 
conceptualization, therefore, attempts to gauge incipient trends and articulate future 
projections, as part of an iterative process of mapping, scanning, schematizing and 
(re)framing 69  legal phenomena related to benefit-sharing, with a view to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHµFDSDFLW\RIODZGUDZLQJXSRQGHHSKLVWRULFDOUHVRXUFHVWRUHFDVW
the ways in which it adGUHVVHVVRPHRI WKHSUREOHPVRIDQ LQWHUFRQQHFWHGZRUOG¶70  
As with other enquiries into global law, therefore, the conceptualization of benefit-
VKDULQJ ILQGV LWVHOI µVRPHZKHUH EHWZHHQ VHWWOHG GRFWULne and an aspirational 
approach.¶71 In this effort, it is further proposed to draw on the multi-disciplinary 
literature on norm diffusion in order to understand how benefit-sharing has become 
embedded in various contexts, while developing an awareness of the role of power 
                                                        
60 TEEB, Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and 
recommendations (2010), www.teebweb.org/, at 11-12; TEEB (n 56), at 9.  
61 Hayden, 'Benefit-sharing: experiments in governance' 
http://programs.ssrc.org/ccit/publications/hayden-benefitsharing.doc 
62 Martin et al (n 29), at 84. 
63 ICJ Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, judgment of 19 December 1978, paras 45-49. 
64 See generally on the evolving interpretation of UN Charter in light of developments in international 
environmental law, Stoll, 'Article 55(a) and (c)' and 'Article 56' in B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (2012) 1535, at 1538-1540 and 1603, at 1605-1610. 
65 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962, para. 1. 
66 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 25(1). 
67 N. Walker, The Intimations of Global Law (2015), at 11-12, 14, 112-113 and 152. 
68 Ibid, at 108. 
69 Ibid, at 25-26, 143 and 112. 
70 Ibid, at 110. 
71 Ibid, at 18 and 21. 
  
and politics in that connection and of possible bias in this type of research, such as the 
assumption that norms that diffuse are desirable or innovative.72 
 
Besides taking a global law approach, the other premise of this paper is that even if 
earlier references to benefit-sharing can be found in international human rights 
instruments and in the law of the sea, conceptualizing benefit-sharing today should 
take international biodiversity law as a reference point. The reasons for this stance is 
that the Convention on Biological Diversity has contributed to significant normative 
development of benefit-sharing, gradually building consensus73 among 196 Parties74 
on both its inter- and intra-State dimensions across different triggering activities 
(bioprospecting, use of knowledge, and natural resource management). International 
human rights law and the law of the sea, in comparison, have focused mainly on intra-
State and inter-State benefit-sharing respectively, and on a narrower range of triggers. 
This may thus explain the occasional, explicit reliance by international human rights 
bodies on the normative development of benefit-sharing under the CBD,75 and similar 
proposals also in the context of the further development of the law of the sea.76  
 
In that connection, the worth of the CBD to provide relevant and applicable norms for 
the interpretation of other international treaties through systemic integration77 is often 
underestimated. The CBD¶V membership is virtually global and its subject matter is 
remarkably wide: it covers the variability of life on earth,78 all human activities that 
may affect biodiversity conservation as a common concern of humankind, 79  and 
arguably even non-living resources that form part of ecosystems. 80  Admittedly, 
however, the open-ended and heavily qualified rules contained in the CBD may not, 
in and of themselves, provide sufficient guidance to the interpreter. One needs to rely 
on the decisions of the CBD Conference of the Parties (COP)81 as subsequent practice 
establishing agreement on the interpretation 82  of relevant CBD rules on benefit-
                                                        
72 Parks and Morgera (n 26). 
73 On the law-making power of consensus see A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International 
Law (2007), 260. 
74 The whole international community is party to the CBD, with the notable exception of the United 
States. 
75 Eg, reliance on Article 8(j) in 'Review of Developments pertaining to the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples' (2001) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2001/2, para 15; reliance on CBD guidelines on socio-cultural and environmental 
impact assessments (Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines, CBD Decision VII/16C (2004), Annex) as a 
pre-condition for benefit-sharing by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Interpretation of the Judgment on 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of 12 August 2008, para. 41 and fn 
23; by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/15/37 (n 22), para. 73; and 
the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/35, para 37, 
which also referred to the CBD work programme on protected areas (CBD Decision VII/28, 2004). 
76 Co-Chairs' summary of discussions at the Working Group on marine biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (2014) UN Doc A/69/177, para 54.  
77 VCLC art. 31(3)(c). 
78 See the definition of biological diversity under CBD Article 2. 
79 CBD preambular para 3. 
80 See the definition of ecosystems under CBD Article 2.  
81 Brunne, 'COP-ing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements' 15 
LJIL (2002) 1. 
82 VCLT, Art. 31(3)(b): First and Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice 
in relation to Treaty Interpretation, UN Doc A/Cn.4/660 (2013) and A/CN.4/671 (2014).  
  
sharing. 83  Notwithstanding the continued reluctance to use explicit human rights 
language,84 this normative activity has contributed to clarify the implications of the 
CBD obligations for the protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples in the 
context of the technicalities of environmental decision-making and management 
processes.85 That said, relevant interpretative guidance is dispersed in a myriad of 
CBD decisions and has not been subject to any significant monitoring or compliance 
process, 86  which explains why the status and broad implications of relevant and 
applicable CBD rules on benefit-sharing have not been appreciated.  
 
 
3. The Concept  
 
The following sections will identify the shared normative elements of benefit-sharing 
in international law by focusing, in turn, on the act of sharing, the nature of the 
benefits to be shared, the activities from which benefit-sharing arise, the beneficiaries, 
and the teleological connection with equity. The conceptualization will start from an 
analysis of the references to benefit-sharing in treaty law: the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the ILC Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No 
169, the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
sharing, and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGR). It will explore textual variations and identify evidence of 
convergence in their interpretation. The discussion will also point to other areas of 
international law where benefit-sharing is emerging, and engage with the limitations 
to the proposed concept with a view to informing future research. The 
conceptualization will distinguish between inter- and intra-State benefit-sharing with 
regards to specific regimes, while attempting to identify a common normative core of 
benefit-sharing that can apply to both, as well as to transnational dimensions of the 
concept. 
 
 
3.1 Sharing 
 
The verb to "share" distinguishes international agreements that encapsulate benefit-
sharing as a specific legal notion from hortatory references to the benefits arising from 
international cooperation more generally. Although the ILO Convention No. 196 does 
not use the verb "to share" (rather the verb "to participate in"), successive 
interpretations of the Convention have repeatedly used a benefit-sharing 
terminology.87 In fact, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights88 and former UN 
Special Rapporteur of Indigenous Peoples' Rights James Anaya89 have emphasized 
that "benefit-sharing," as encapsulated in the ILO Convention, refers to an inherent 
                                                        
83 Morgera and Tsioumani (n 21). 
84 Morgera, ³$JDLQVW$OO2GGV7KH&RQWULEXWLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQRQ%LRORJLFDO'LYHUVLW\WR
,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ´LQ$OODQGHWDOHGVUnity and Diversity of International Law. 
Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy (2014) 983.  
85 See n 75 above. 
86 Morgera and Tsioumani, 'Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity' 21 YbIEL (2011) 3, at 23-25. 
87 Eg, Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2009, published 99th ILC session (2010), para 11. 
88 Saramaka (n 2), para 138. 
89 A/HRC/15/37 (n 22), paras. 67 and 76-78. 
  
component of indigenous peoples' rights to land and natural resources that is implicit 
in the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
In all events, it has been argued that "to share" and "to participate" in the benefits 
convey the same idea of agency, rather than of the passive enjoyment of benefits.90 
The ways in which the action of "sharing" is spelt out in relevant international 
materials discussed below, in effect, points to a concerted effort in identifying and 
apportioning benefits through a dialogic process. In other words, benefit-sharing 
differs from unidirectional (top-down) flows of benefits, and rather aims at developing 
a common understanding of what the benefits at stake are and how they should be 
shared. In this connection, it has been argued that benefit-sharing is geared towards 
consensus-building:91 it entails a long-term process, rather than a one-off exercise, of 
good-faith engagement among different actors that lays the foundation for a 
partnership among them.92 In the inter-State context, this arguably refers to the idea of 
a global partnership enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development,93 both in terms of a 'new level of cooperation' between developed and 
developing States,94 and also a form of cosmopolitan cooperation,95 which includes 
(controversial) public-private partnerships but extends also to other cooperative 
relations between States and civil society that are inspired by a vision of public 
trusteeship.96 With regard to the intra-State dimension of benefit-sharing, partnership 
specifically refers to an approach to accommodate State sovereignty over natural 
sovereignty and indigenous peoples' self-determination.97  
 
The verb sharing also implies that not every actor may play an active part in a certain 
activity that triggers benefit-sharing, but everyone should participate in some of the 
benefits derived from it.98 This is probably the least studied aspect in all treaties that 
include benefit-sharing: beyond a mere logic of exchange, benefit-sharing serves to 
recognize, reward, promote and renew/strengthen the conditions for the production of 
global benefits (such as scientific advancements for global food security and global 
health, or ecosystem services) that derive from specific activities that trigger benefit-
                                                        
90 Mancisidor (n 36).  
91 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report to the Human Rights Council (2009) 
UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, para. 53; A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para 88. 
92 On the intra-State dimension of benefit-sharing, see, eg, A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), paras 75-77 and 92; 
and 'Review of Developments pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples' (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2001/2, para 19. 
On the inter-State dimension, see, eg, Report of the high-level task force on the implementation of the 
right to development on its second meeting (2005) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3, para 82. 
93 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, preamble and principles 7 and 27. 
94 Dupuy, 'The Philosophy of the Rio Declaration' in J. Vinuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: A Commentary (2015) 65, at 69 and 71. See generally R. Wolfrum and 
C. Kojima (eds), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (2010).  
95 Dupuy (n 94) at 72; and Francioni 'The Preamble of the Rio Declaration' in Vinuales (n 94) 85, at 89. 
96 Sand, 'Cooperation in a Spirit of Global Partnership' in Vinuales (n 94) 617, who refers as a concrete 
example to the ITPGR. 
97 FitzmauricH
7KH4XHVWLRQRI,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶5LJKWVD7LPHIRU5HDSSUDLVDO"
LQ'. French 
(ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law 
(2013) 349, at 375; A/HRC/15/37 (n 22), para 53. 
98 Schabas (n 36), at 276, referring to the traveaux preparatoirs of Article 27(1) of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights.  
  
sharing among specific parties. As discussed below, however, international rules on 
benefit-sharing have mostly developed with regard to the sharing of benefits among 
those directly participating in the triggering activity and often enshrine the underlying 
production of global benefits in the treaty objective,99 with the intention of providing 
a yardstick to scrutinize the suitability of implementing measures in sharing benefits 
beyond the specific parties involved in a triggering activity. Occasionally, specific 
obligations concern the sharing of global benefits deriving from specific triggering 
activities, in which case vulnerable beneficiaries tend to be privileged. For instance, 
the ITPGR foresees that benefits deriving from the use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture flow directly and indirectly to farmers in all countries, 
particularly in developing countries, irrespective of whether they have contributed 
relevant genetic material to the Multilateral System, according to internationally-
agreed upon eligibility and selection criteria.100 In other regimes, these obligations 
remain much more indeterminate.101 
 
3.1.1 Inter-State benefit-sharing 
 
In the inter-State dimension, there appear to be two fundamental ways to share 
benefits among States - multilateral and bilateral, with the latter being a residual 
solution and the former being confined to specialized ambits of application.  
 
The multilateral sharing of benefits, which has been resorted to in the context of 
natural resource use within the common heritage regime and specialized areas of 
bioprospecting, occurs through multilateral decision-making within an international 
organization leading to the determination of standard contractual clauses. This is the 
case, under the law of the sea, of how benefits are shared from the minerals in the 
deep sea-bed: 102  the development of precise rules and procedures is left to the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA).103 Due to the fact that activities in the deep 
seabed have not yet reached the stage of exploitation of resources, however, the ISA 
has not yet elaborated on revenue-sharing, but has already put in place non-monetary 
benefit-sharing rules.104 Under the ITPGR, a Standard Material Transfer agreement 
has been agreed upon, with two mandatory monetary benefit-sharing options for the 
commercial use of a specified list of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(such as rice, potato and maize).105 In these cases,106 the multilateral decision-making 
rules applicable determine how State Parties arrive through dialogue to a concerted 
determination of the sharing modalities. 
                                                        
99 CBD Article 1, ITPRG Article 1, and Nagoya Protocol Article 1. 
100 ITPGR Article 13(3) and annexes 1-3 to the Funding Strategy in 2007: FAO, Report of the 
Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(2007).  
101 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(b). 
102 UNCLOS Articles 136-141. 
103 UNCLOS Article 160 (2)(f)(i) and (g). 
104 J Harrison, 'The Sustainable Development of Mineral Resources of the International Seabed Area: 
The Role of the Authority in Balancing Economic Development and Environmental Protection' (SSRN 
2014), discussing benefit-sharing obligations included in the regulations for prospecting and 
exploration of seabed mineral resources. 
105 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006. 
106 But also in the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for the sharing of 
influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits (effective 24 May 2011) WHO Doc 
WHA64.5. 
  
 
As opposed to the circumscribed areas of deep-sea bed minerals and plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, bilateral107 sharing of benefits is envisaged under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity108 and its Nagoya Protocol109 as a residual 
regime with regard to transboundary bio-prospecting.110 In this case, benefit-sharing 
is operationalized through ad hoc private-law contracts ('mutually agreed terms'),111 
instead of standard agreements decided by an international decision-making body. 
These treaties thus leave national rules to govern these contracts, without providing 
specific substantive criteria in that regard112  and without creating an international 
mechanism to oversee how benefits are shared in particular cases. 113  While 
contractual negotiations may in principle also be seen as a consensus-building, 
dialogic way to share benefits, leaving partnership building to contractual freedom 
raises concerns in the face of the well-documented, unequal bargaining powers at 
stake.114 In partial recognition of this challenge in the bilateral context, the gradual 
development of international guidance (likely of a soft-law nature) on the terms of 
sharing is foreseen, including in dialogue with non-State actors,115 but to a lesser 
extent than in multilateral systems. 
 
3.1.2 Intra-State benefit-sharing 
 
With the exception of the Nagoya Protocol that refers to mutually agreed terms,116 
international treaties on intra-State benefit-sharing do not spell out in any comparable 
way to inter-State benefit-sharing how sharing is to be undertaken. This may be 
explained by the fact that appropriate benefit-sharing systems have to be established 
'on a case by case basis, taking into account the circumstances of the particular 
VLWXDWLRQRIWKHLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHVFRQFHUQHG¶117 aQGµFDQWDNHDYDULHW\RIIRUPV¶118  
 
Both in the context of biodiversity and human rights, a (domestic) public law 
approach could be used to share benefits, through direct payments or the 
                                                        
107 Although note the possibility for a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to be established under 
Nagoya Protocol Article 10: Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17), at 197-208. 
108 CBD Article 15(7). See also Agenda 21, paras 15(4)(d), 15(4)(j) and 16(7)(a). 
109 The Nagoya Protocol Article 5. 
110 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17) at 85. 
111 As is explicitly foreseen in CBD Article 15(7), last sentence, and the last sentence of Nagoya 
Protocol Article 5(1), ZKHUHUHIHUHQFHLVPDGHWRµPXWXDOO\DJUHHGWHUPV¶ 
112 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1-2 and 5) and 10th preambular recital. See Tvedt, 'Beyond Nagoya: 
Towards a Legally Functional System of Access and Benefit-Sharing' in S. Oberthür and K. Rosendal 
(eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing After the Nagoya 
Protocol (2013) 158. 
113 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17) at 282. 
114 Ibid, at 7. 
115 Nagoya Protocol Art. 30 and Decision NP-1/4 (2012); as well as Nagoya Protocol Articles 19(2) 
and 20(2). 
116 Nagoya Protocol Arts. 5(2) and 5(5). Contrast with CBD Article 8(j) and ILO Convention No 169, 
Art 15(2). 
117 ,/2µ0RQLWRULQJ,QGLJHQRXVDQG7ULEDO3HRSOHV
ULJKWVWKURXJK,/2&RQYHQWLRQV$&RPSLODWLRQ
of ILO Supervisory Bodies' Comments 2009-¶2EVHUYDWLRQ1RUZD\&($5&WK
session, at 95. 
118 ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No 169 (2009), 
at 107-108. 
  
establishment of trust funds by the government,119 as well as the legal recognition of 
communities' customary practices, participatory planning and/or shared or delegated 
natural resource management.120 In addition, benefits can be shared through practical 
cooperation and support from the government to communities, by sharing scientific 
information, building capacity, facilitating market access and providing assistance in 
diversifying management capacities.121 When the private sector is involved, however, 
a private-law contractual approach seems needed for setting up joint ventures and 
licenses with preferential conditions with communities, 122  although it cannot be 
excluded that governments could decide to set standard contracts in that regard.  
 
As all these sharing modalities could be put in place in a top-down fashion with 
disruptive or divisive effects on beneficiary communities,123 both international human 
rights and biodiversity instruments point to the need for the sharing of benefits to be 
culturally appropriate and endogenously identified.124 In other words, even if treaty 
law leaves significant leeway to States in determining appropriate forms of sharing 
benefits with communities, culturally appropriate sharing would be difficult to ensure 
in the absence of a good-faith, consensus-building process with communities. 
Similarly, international developments on business responsibility to respect human 
rights have spelt out that benefit-sharing, as part of the due diligence of companies 
operating extractive projects in or near indigenous lands, entails good faith 
consultations with communities with a view to agreeing on benefit-sharing modalities 
that make them partners in project decision-making, not only give them a share in 
profits (for instance, through a minority ownership interest).125 
 
 
3.2 Benefits 
 
International treaties containing benefit-sharing obligations define the nature of the 
benefits to be shared to various degrees. The Nagoya Protocol is the only instrument 
that provides a detailed (non-exhaustive) list of benefits that may apply to both intra- 
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WRWKH1DJR\D3URWRFRO¶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191, para 201. 
120 Eg Work programme on protected areas (n 75), paras 2(1)(3)-2(1)(5); Addis Ababa Principles and 
Guidelines on the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (CBD Decision VII/12 (2004), Annex II, operational 
guidelines to Principle 4; CBD expanded work programme on forest biodiversity (CBD Decision VI/22 
(2002) paras 13 and 31. 
121 Akwe: Kon Guidelines (n 75), para 40. 
122 CBD Guidelines on Tourism (n 5), para 23; Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (n 120), 
operational guidelines to principle 12. 
123 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kichwa Indigenous Communitiy of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
(Merits and reparations, Judgment of 27 June 2012) para 194; or Endorois (n 8), para 274; and CBD 
Guidelines on Tourism (n 5), para II(27); and PRAI, Principle 12. 
124 Saramaka (n 79), paras 25-2; refinement and elaboration of the ecosystem approach, CBD Decision 
VII/11 (2004), Annex, para 1(8) and 2(1); and Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct on Respect for 
the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities, CBD Decision X/42 
(2010), Annex, para 14. 
125 A/HRC/15/37 (n 22), para. 46 and A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para, 75. 
  
and inter-State benefit-sharing. 126  More generally applicable specifications with 
respect to the benefits of intra-State benefit-sharing can then be found in soft-law 
documents and case law. In all these cases, a menu of benefits to be shared is offered, 
the nature of which is invariably both economic and non-economic. This allows for 
taking into account, through the concerted, dialogic process of sharing, beneficiaries' 
needs, values and priorities, and possibly µGLIIerent understandings of justice,¶127 with 
a view to selecting the combination of benefits that lays the foundation for 
partnership. While the nature of the benefits is mostly defined with regard to the 
parties to the triggering activity, several immediate benefits shared among them are 
meant to preserve, restore or enhance the conditions under which underlying global 
benefits (such as ecosystem services) are produced. The benefits to be shared are thus 
seen as contributions to human well-being.128 That said, the interplay and tensions 
between economic and non-economic benefits, as well as between their immediate 
and global relevance, remain unclear and contentious.  
 
3.2.1 Inter-State benefit-sharing 
 
In the case of the law of the sea, the nature of the benefits has become clear with 
practice. While the International Seabed Authority is still working out how to share 
monetary benefits from mining in the Area, as expressly provided for by 
UNCLOS,129 it has already regulated the sharing of non-monetary benefits such as 
training, capacity building, scientific information and cooperation,130 as implicit in 
the common heritage concept. 131  In addition, the Authority has created an 
endowment fund for marine scientific research in the Area,132 which was initially 
filled with the balance of the application fees paid by pioneer investors and is 
currently dependent on donations.133 The possibility to choose among monetary and 
non-monetary benefits thus has the advantage of allowing the sharing of more 
immediately available (generally non-monetary) benefits, while monetary benefits 
are being accrued. Non-monetary benefits are also aimed at increasing the 
capabilities of countries that are not able to directly participate in the triggering 
activity. Along similar lines, under the ITPGR, a benefit-sharing fund is at present 
filled with donations in order to contribute to capacity building and technology 
transfer,134 as monetary benefits have been defined (as percentages of gross sales of 
                                                        
126 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(4) and Annex. The distinction between monetary and non-monetary 
benefits has emerged in the CBD Bonn Guidelines on Access and Benefit-sharing and the Nagoya 
Protocol (Glowka and Normand, 'The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing: Innovations in 
International Environmental Law' in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani (n 31) 21, at 23). 
127 Simm, 'Benefit-sharing: An Inquiry regarding the Meaning and Limits of the Concept of Human 
Genetic Research' 1 Genomics, Society and Policy (2005) 29, at 29-30. 
128 Report on the Right to Science (n 36) para 22. 
129 UNCLOS Article 140.  
130 Harrison (n 104).  
131 Wolfrum, 'Common Heritage of Mankind' in Wolfrum (n 20), paras 18-19); Lodge, 'The Common 
Heritage of Mankind' 27 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2012) 733, at 740. 
132 Resolution establishing an endowment fund for marine scientific research in the Area, 
ISBA/12/A/11 (2006). 
133 Harrison (n 104). 
134 E. Tsioumani, 'Exploring Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing from the Lab to the Land (Part I): 
Agricultural Research and Development in the Context of Conservation and the Sustainable Use of 
Agricultural Biodiversity' (SSRN, 2014) at 31-33. 
  
commercialization of products) but not yet materialized. 135  On the other hand, 
however, the experience under the ITPGR - the most sophisticated international 
benefit-sharing mechanism - casts a shadow over the feasibility of monetary benefits 
under other, less sophisticated regimes such as the Nagoya Protocol (which identifies 
monetary benefits as profits in the form of access fees, up-front or milestone 
payments, royalties or license fees136).  
 
Significant other benefits have also been identified by the CBD as participation in 
biotechnological research and in the results of biotechnological research.137 These 
were expanded upon in the Nagoya Protocol to include participation in product 
development and admittance to ex situ facilities and databases,138 joint ventures with 
foreign researchers and joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights 
(IPR).139 While questions related to IPRs remain the most controversial and well-
studied,140 the trade-offs between different forms of non-monetary benefits have not 
been fully analyzed. On the one hand, non-monetary benefits such as technology 
transfer and capacity-building can be essential to enhance the ability of beneficiaries 
to share in monetary benefits in the long term.141 On the other hand, they may create 
dependency on external, ready-made solutions that may not fit particular 
circumstances, or may allow for the exertion of undue influence by donor 
countries.142 In addition, as will be discussed in the next section, there has not been 
sufficient legal analysis to distinguish capacity-building and technology transfer under 
benefit-sharing regimes from general obligations in this regard in other international 
environmental agreements. In other words, no legal investigation has ventured into 
the relationship between benefit-sharing and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility that underlies financial and technological solidarity 
obligations. 
 
In addition, the conceptual relation between benefits and access to natural resources 
or knowledge is unclear.143  Under the ITPGR, access to plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture through a multilateral system is considered a benefit in itself, as 
the exchange of these resources is indispensable for the continuation of agricultural 
research and food security.144 Access to genetic resources in other countries, through 
bilateral channels, could arguably also be seen as a benefit in the context of the CBD, 
although CBD Parties have rather emphasized that access is a pre-condition for 
sharing benefits.145  
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136 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(a-e). 
137 CBD Articles 1, 15(5) and 16 and 19. 
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144 ITPGR Art. 13. 
145 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17) at 49-52. 
  
 
 
3.2.2 Intra-State benefit-sharing 
 
The types of benefits to be shared at the intra-State level have been mostly specified 
in international environmental law (ITPGR and the Nagoya Protocol with specific 
regard to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and CBD COP decisions with 
regard to natural resource management). But both in the case of international 
environmental and human rights law, a menu of monetary and non-monetary benefits 
have been referred to, albeit with different emphasis: as a reward for ecosystem 
stewardship in international biodiversity law and as compensation in international 
human rights law. In either case, non-monetary benefits have been less prominent, 
although empirical evidence suggests that they may exceed the importance of 
monetary benefits for communities' wellbeing.146 
 
In the context of the use of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and natural 
resources under international biodiversity law, monetary and non-monetary benefits 
appear to amount to a reward for traditional knowledge holders and ecosystem 
stewards for their positive contribution to humanity's well-being through the 
ecosystem services they provide, maintain or restore and from scientific advances and 
innovation that build on their traditional knowledge. For these reasons, the nature of 
the benefits is linked to the aim of allowing communities to continue to provide 
global benefits by preserving and protecting the communal way of life that develops 
and maintains their traditional knowledge and ecosystem stewardship. 147  Non-
monetary benefits to be shared to this end comprise the legal recognition of 
community-based natural resource management,148 and incorporation of traditional 
knowledge in environmental impact assessments 149  and in natural resource 
management planning150 - all can be seen as ways for beneficiaries to be formally 
recognized as partners in resource management. Another key benefit specific to the 
agricultural sector is the continuation of traditional uses and exchanges of seeds,151 
which is considered essential for farmers to continue to significantly contribute to 
global food security.152 Furthermore, non-monetary benefits have been identified as 
different forms of support to enable communities to navigate increasingly complex 
and ever-changing technical, policy and legal landscapes (from the global to the local 
level) that affect their traditional way of life: scientific and technical information and 
know-how, direct investment opportunities, facilitated access to markets, and support 
for the diversification of income-generating opportunities for small and medium-sized 
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programme on forest biodiversity (n 120) para 13); Agenda 21, para 15(4)(g) and Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation, para 44(j).  
151 Nagoya Protocol art. 12(4); ITPGR Art 9(3). 
152 See discussion in Tsioumani (n 134) at 36-37. 
  
businesses.153 Monetary benefits, in turn, include a share of profits deriving from 
commercial products or products generated through conservation and sustainable use 
activities (park entrance fees, for instance), job creation and payments for ecosystem 
services.154 Risks attached to different forms of benefits to be shared, however, have 
not been fully or systematically analyzed. For instance, community-based 
management of natural resources within protected areas may impose a very high 
burden on communities to ensure the respect of environmental and animal and plant 
health regulations in the face of global crises such as elephant poaching. 155  Or 
communities may be subject to concessions with short and insecure tenure and 
relatively high payments. More generally, little attention has so far been paid to the 
costs and losses for communities that may be associated with certain benefits.156 
 
In regional human rights case law, benefit-sharing has been portrayed as a form of 
compensation157 with an emphasis on monetary benefits. Under the ILO Convention, 
reference has been made to sharing the profits from oil-producing activities.158 The 
African Commission has, along similar lines, called for profit-sharing from the 
creation of a game reserve and employment creation.159 In the Saramaka case, the 
Inter-American Court ordered the creation of a community development fund, making 
reference to the 'suffering and distress that the members of the Saramaka people have 
endured as a result of the long and ongoing struggle for the legal recognition of their 
right to the territory they have traditionally used and occupied for centuries ... as well 
as their frustration with a domestic legal system.'160 In this connection, the former UN 
Special Rapporteur Anaya tried to distinguish benefit-sharing and compensation, 
while recognizing their connection.161 On that and other bases, it can be argued that 
benefit-sharing adds to compensation for material and immaterial damage (including 
environmental damage affecting indigenous peoples' subsistence and spiritual 
connection with their territory)162 by making up for broader, historical inequities that 
have determined the situation in which the specific material and immaterial damage 
has arisen. 163  In addition, it can be also argued that benefits, as opposed to 
compensation that is expected to make up for lost control over resources and income-
generation opportunities, combine instead new opportunities of income generation 
and continued, or possibly enhanced, control over the use of the lands and resources 
affected by the development.164 
 
                                                        
153 Ibid, para 40 and 46; Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (n 120) rationale to Principle 4; 
Guidelines on Tourism (n 5) paras 22-23 and 43); Bonn Guidelines (n 1) para 50. 
154 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines (n 75) para 46. 
155 Nollkaemper (n 27). 
156 Wynberg and Hauck (n 146), at 158. 
157 Saramaka (n 2), paras 138-140; Endorois (n 8), paras 298-299 and 295. 
158 Report of the Committee set up to Examine the Representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador 
of ILO Convention No. 169 (2001) ILO Doc GB.282/14/4, para 44(3). 
159 Endorois (n 8), para. 228 and recommendations. 
160 Saramaka (n 2), paras 200-201. 
161 A/HRC/15/37 (n 22), paras 67, 89 and 91; A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para 76.  
162 M Orellana, 'Saramaka People v Suriname Judgment' (2008) 102 AJIL 841, at 845 and 847. 
163 A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para 76). Other bodies have not elaborated on the point: UNPFII, Review of 
World Bank operational policies (2013) UN Doc E/C.19/2013/15, para 27; Ecuador (2001) ILO Doc 
GB.282/14/2, para 44(c)(3), and Bolivia (1999) ILO Doc. GB.272/8/1:GB.274/16/7, para 40. 
164 Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, 'Progress report on extractive industries' (2012) UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47, paras. 68, 74 and 76; and A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para, 75. 
  
Both in international biodiversity law and in international human rights law, therefore, 
certain forms of benefits to be shared may serve to empower and share authority with 
communities on environmental protection, natural resource management and 
development.165 Empirical evidence, however, has shown that genuine shifts of rights 
and authority over natural resources to communities through benefit-sharing have not 
occurred. 166  In addition, concerns have been raised that benefit-sharing could be 
PLVXVHGWRµUHQHJRWLDWH¶communities' human rights or put a price-tag on them.167 In 
effect, the legal and other guarantees that are necessary to prevent or minimize these 
risks have not yet been analyzed. In principle, benefit-sharing is expected to operate 
as an add-on (a safeguard) to relevant human rights, but there is little guidance other 
than engaging in good-faith, consensus-based negotiations with communities.168 More 
study is needed on the interactions between benefit-sharing and procedural rights 
(access to information, decision-making and justice) 169  and legal empowerment 
approaches. 170  In addition, considering the reality of many (developed and 
developing) countries where natural resource-related rights are not settled, recognized 
or documented, it remains to be ascertained whether and under which conditions 
benefit-sharing may act as a pragmatic process to gradually create the infrastructure 
necessary for the full recognition, documentation and protection of human rights. 
 
 
3.3 Triggers 
 
As anticipated, the activities that trigger benefit-sharing obligations are 
bioprospecting, certain natural resource use and environmental protection measures, 
and the production of knowledge. With regard to inter-State benefit-sharing, 
obligations were originally attached to the use of natural resources under the common 
heritage regime, which - together with most developed benefit-sharing mechanisms 
now related to bio-prospecting - are the most well-studied cases. But there seems to 
be an ongoing and under-studied expansion of international regimes that may embody 
inter-State benefit-sharing, by way of interpretation, in relation to other natural 
resources that are subject to different international limitations to the rights of States 
(shared natural resources or common concern of mankind).171 With regards to intra-
State benefit-sharing, benefit-sharing obligations have been triggered by almost any 
use of natural resources or any environmental protection measure that may negatively 
impact on international human rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, 
                                                        
165 Empowerment was linked to benefit-sharing in the Endorois decision (n 8, para 283). Benefit-
sharing is considered 'effectively expand[ing] on the principle of effective participation by 
Pentassuglia, 'Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights' 22 EJIL (2011) 165, 
at 176. 
166 Note the mixed picture arising in this regard from benefit-sharing as part of community-based 
wildlife management initiatives in Africa: Nelson, 'Introduction' in F. Nelson (ed), Community Rights, 
Conservation and Contested Lands: The Politics of Natural Resource Governance in Africa (2010) 3, 
at 4 and 11.  
167 The concern has been raised by Orellana (n 162) at 847. 
168 N 15 above.  
169 Rio Declaration Principle 10. Note that Sand considered Rio Principle 27 on a global partnership as 
the substantive basis for the exercise of the procedural rights enshrined in Principle 10: Sand (n 94), at 
630-631. 
170 This is particularly the case of the "community protocols" for which an international obligation to 
support has been included in the Nagoya Protocol Art. 12(3)(a). 
171 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 51), at 190 ff. 
  
both under international biodiversity and human rights law, with little attention paid 
so far to possible cross-fertilization between the two. Finally, with regards to the 
production of knowledge, this has been preeminently the traditional knowledge of 
indigenous peoples and local communities, but also extends to other forms of 
knowledge in the context of the human right to science.  
 
3.3.1 Inter-State benefit-sharing 
 
Originally, inter-State benefit-sharing was part of the common heritage regime. It 
was thus associated with natural resources that cannot be appropriated to the 
exclusive sovereignty of States, must be conserved and exploited for the benefit of 
mankind, without discrimination and for peaceful purposes, and are subject to 
international management. While several commentators saw benefit-sharing from 
minerals in the Area as the most controversial element of common heritage, and as 
such responsible for the very cautious use of this principle in international law,172 the 
uptake of benefit-sharing as a self-standing approach in the international regime on 
bioprospecting has proven that the concept is capable of adapting173 to the legal 
specificities of genetic resources under the sovereignty of third countries (under the 
Nagoya Protocol) or held in trust by an international network of collections (under 
the ITPGR). Benefit-sharing has now come full circle: its normative development 
under the ITPGR and Nagoya Protocol is likely to influence the further development 
of the law of the sea with regard to living resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.174 
 
More recently, benefit-sharing has surfaced in other areas of international 
environmental law through interpretation. This is the case of regimes applying to 
shared natural resources, and to environmental matters of common concern to 
mankind. With regards to the former, in the international law on transboundary 
watercourses,175 benefit-sharing has been seen as an extension of the general principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilization, challenging inter-State cooperation as 
traditionally focused on purely quantitative allocations of water. 176  Accordingly, 
benefit-sharing leads to a consideration of more sophisticated forms of inter-State 
                                                        
172 Eg Shackelford, 'The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind' 28 Stanford Environmental 
Law Journal (2009) 109, at 128; and Noyes, 'The Common Heritage of Mankind: Past, Present and 
Future' 40 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2011-2012) 447, at 451 and 469-470; 
Frakes, 'The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and 
Antarctica: Will Developed And Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?' 21 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal (2003) 409, at 417. 
173 In effect, UNCLOS already included other articulations of benefit-sharing related to resources 
outside of the common heritage regime: UNCLOS Article 82(1) and (4). It has also been argued that 
benefit-sharing is foreseen in the regulation of marine scientific research under UNCLOS: Salpin, 'The 
Law of the Sea: A before and an after Nagoya?' in Morgera, Buck, and Tsioumani (n 31), 149. 
174 In the context of the negotiating process launched by UN General Assembly Resolution 69/292 of 
2015. See n 76 above. 
175 Abseno, 'The Concept of Equitable Utilisation, No significant Harm and Benefit-sharing under the 
River Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement: Some Highlights on Theory and Practice' 20 Journal 
of Water Law (2009) 86; Paisley, 'Adversaries into Partners: International Water Law and the Equitable 
Sharing of Downstream Benefits' 3 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2002) 280. 
176 Wouters and 0R\QLKDQµ%HQHILW-VKDULQJLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO:DWHU/DZ¶LQ). Loures and A. Rieu-
Clarke (eds), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force: Strengthening International Law for 
Transboundary Water Management (2013) 321.  
  
cooperation that factor in non-water-related (economic, socio-cultural and broader 
environmental) benefits arising from the enhanced stewardship of a shared 
watercourse, that would normally be undertaken by an upstream State. 177  Water 
lawyers and practitioners are increasingly looking into this development, but have not 
fully investigated cross-fertilization with international biodiversity law in that regard. 
Interactions between inter- and intra-State benefit-sharing remain to be explored in 
consideration of communities' role in the conservation of inland water ecosystems and 
related traditional knowledge,178 and so do possible synergies and tensions with the 
human right to water. 
 
In addition, an argument appears to be put forward that inter-State benefit-sharing is 
relevant in the context of those international environmental regimes whose object is 
characterized as a common concern of mankind and that routinely include financial 
assistance and technology transfer obligations. This interpretation emerges from 
international human rights processes such as the ongoing international effort to 
define a µKXPDQ ULJht to international solidarity¶179 and the long-standing efforts to 
clarify the controversial right to development.180 It is also the case of recent efforts to 
conceptually clarify the human right to science with regard to technology transfer.181 
Leaving aside the debate on the worth of solidarity human rights,182 these efforts 
express a discontent about the current level of cooperation under international 
environmental law, particularly the international climate change regime, and 
arguably make recourse to benefit-sharing to bring about a partnership in 
implementing financial and technological solidarity obligations. But there is no 
explicit reference to intra-State benefit-sharing in the international climate regime 
and little practice in international biodiversity law in this regard.183 It thus remains to 
be clarified whether relying on the concept of benefit-sharing through a human rights 
lens may be useful as an analytic tool, if not an obligation, for deepening the 
understanding of the content of, and consequences of non-compliance with, 
international provisions on finance, technology and capacity-building or even to 
inject a different dynamic in ongoing negotiations such as those on climate change.184   
 
 3.3.2 Intra-State benefit-sharing  
 
                                                        
177 0F,QW\UHµ%HQHILW-sharing and upstream / downstream cooperation for ecological protection of 
transboundary waters: opportunities for China as DQXSVWUHDP6WDWH¶ Water International (2015) 48, 
at 50. 
178 Shelton, 'Water Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities' in L. Boisson de Chazounes, 
C. Leb and M. Tignino (eds), International Law and Freshwater: The Multiple Challenges (2013) 69, 
at 80. 
179 Report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity to the General 
Assembly (2013) UN Doc A/68/176, para 27(d). 
180 In its so-FDOOHGµWKLUGGLPHQVLRQ¶5HSRUWRIWKH+LJK-level Task Force on the Implementation of the 
Right to Development on its Sixth Session: Right to Development Criteria and Operational Sub-criteria 
(2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2, criteria 3(b)(i)-(ii). 
181 UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Report on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of 
Scientific Progress and its Applications (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/26, paras 65-69. 
182 Alston, 'A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of 
International Human Rights Law?' 29 Netherlands International Law Review (1982) 307. 
183 Eg, CBD technology transfer work programme, Decision VII/29 (2004) paras. 3.2.8 and 3.2.9. 
184 A. Savaresi, 'The Emergence of Benefit-sharing under the Climate Regime: A Preliminary 
Exploration and Research Agenda' (SSRN, 2015). 
  
The activities that trigger intra-State benefit-sharing are the exploitation of natural 
resources or the creation of environmental protection measures in, or affecting, the 
lands of indigenous peoples and local communities, and the use of their traditional 
knowledge. The rationale, however, differs in international biodiversity law 
(ecosystem stewardship) and international human rights law (human rights to 
property and culture), which can be explained in the light of the different objectives 
and scope of these areas of international law.  
 
Under the CBD, it is through interpretation in relation to the ecosystems approach185 
that benefit-sharing has been developed as an incentive for the good management 
practices of indigenous and local communities, as well as of other stakeholders, that 
are responsible for the production and sustainable management of ecosystem 
functions.186 This has provided the conceptual departure point for developing soft-law 
guidance on intra-State benefit-sharing both with regard to natural resource use187 and 
with regard to conservation measures (protected areas188 and climate change response 
measures). 189  It has also led to the development of a specific benefit-sharing 
obligation owed to communities as stewards of JHQHWLF UHVRXUFHV µKHOG E\ WKHP¶ 
under the Nagoya Protocol.190   
 
On the human rights side, regional case law has built on the ILO Convention No. 169 
to clarify that benefit-sharing is triggered by the exploitation of traditionally owned 
lands and natural resources necessary for the survival of indigenous and tribal 
peoples, or by the establishment of environmental protection measures negatively 
affecting them.191 This interpretation has been increasingly relied upon other human 
rights processes. 192  Benefit-sharing has been invoked in relation to indigenous 
peoples' right to property of lands and natural resources, 193  culture and non-
discrimination,194 and their right to development,195 also in the context of large-scale 
investments in farmland impacting on the right to food.196 Overall, however, limited 
attention has been paid specifically to benefit-sharing in human rights policy and 
academic circles SRVVLEO\ EHFDXVH LW LV VHHQ DV DQ µadditional VDIHJXDUG¶197 to the 
                                                        
185 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach, CBD Decision V/6 (2000), para 9. 
186 Ibid, Annex, Operational Guidance 2, para 9; CBD refinement and elaboration of the ecosystem 
approach (n 124), Annex, para 12.5. 
187 Eg Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (n 120), Annex II: Practical principle 12. 
188 CBD Decision VII/27 (n 75) Annex, paras 2(1) and 2(1)(4) (while the latter refers to both benefit- 
and cost-sharing, the focus on benefit-sharing is clarified in CBD Decision IX/18 (2008), preamble 
para 5). 
189 This would be, for instance, the justification for CBD decision XI/19 (2012) on REDD+. 
190 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2): Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17), at 117-126. 
191 Saramaka (n 2) and Endorois (n 8). 
192 Eg, UN Indigenous Peoples' Partnership, Strategic Framework 2011-2015; and Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management 
and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes to the Human Rights Council (2012) UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/48, paras 36 and 69(h).  
193 UNPFII (n 163), para 27; and Saramaka (n 2), para 138. 
194 'Progress report on extractive industries' (n 164), paras 50-52.  
195 Endorois (n 8), paras 294-295. 
196 5HSRUWRIWKH816SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXURQWKHULJKWWRIRRGµ/DUJH-scale land acquisitions and leases: 
$VHWRIPLQLPXPSULQFLSOHVDQGPHDVXUHVWRDGGUHVVWKHKXPDQULJKWVFKDOOHQJH¶81'RF
A/HRC/13/33/Add.2, paras 30-33. 
197 A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para 52 (emphasis added).  
  
complex and still unsettled notion of free prior informed consent (FPIC).198 Much 
therefore remains to be clarified about the interactions between benefit-sharing and 
FPIC. On the one hand, benefit-sharing may serve as a condition for the granting of 
FPIC, thereby contributing to culturally appropriate and effective consultations199 and 
affecting the scope of environmental and socio-economic impact assessment. On the 
other hand, benefit-sharing may represents the end-result of an FPIC process, thereby 
providing concrete expression of the accord granted by indigenous peoples on the 
basis of their own understandings and preferences.200 It also remains to be determined 
whether benefit-sharing could be required when FPIC is not.201 
 
With regard to traditional knowledge, a qualified obligation to encourage intra-State 
benefit-sharing in the CBD202 has been interpreted through a series of COP decisions 
to apply more broadly to communities' customary sustainable use of biological 
resources203  across all the thematic areas of work of the Convention.204  This has 
developed into a binding obligation under the Nagoya Protocol in relation to 
traditional knowledge that is more narrowly construed as "associated with genetic 
resources".205 While it has been acknowledged in a human rights context that benefit-
sharing is also called for when the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples is at 
stake,206 there has been no elaboration in this connection by human rights bodies.207  
This gap has been recognized by CBD Parties, who initiated a process to develop 
international guidelines on prior informed consent and on benefit-sharing from the use 
of traditional knowledge in late 2014.208 In addition, because of the political emphasis 
placed on biopiracy as the unlawful use of traditional knowledge for commercial 
innovation purposes, little attention has been paid to benefit-sharing from the non-
commercial use of traditional knowledge, including in the context of pure research 
                                                        
198 For instance, the lengthy monograph by E Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature 
Conservation (2011) does not mention benefit-sharing. 
199 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, µ)ROORZ-up Report on Indigenous Peoples 
and the Right to Participate in Decision-PDNLQJZLWKD)RFXVRQ([WUDFWLYH,QGXVWULHV¶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81'RF
A/HRC/21/55, para 43. 
200 A/HRC/24/41 (n 15), para 43. 
201 Pasqualucci, 'International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in light of the United National Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2009-2010) 51, at 91. 
202 CBD Article 8(j). This understanding can also be found in other legal developments contemporary 
to the CBD, such as Agenda 21, paras 15(4)(g) and 15(5)(e). 
203 CBD Article 10(c). 
204 Eg CBD revised work programme on inland water biodiversity, Decision VII/4 (2004) Annex, para 
9; CBD work programme on island biodiversity, Decision VIII/1 (2009) Annex, Target 9.2; and CBD 
work programme on drylands, Decision VIII/2 (2006), Target 9.2. 
205 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(5) and 7: see discussion in Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17), at 126-
130. See also benefit-VKDULQJIURPIDUPHUV¶WUDGLWLRQDONQRZOHGJHFRPELQHGUHDGLQJRI$UWLFOHV
9(2)(a) and 13(3) ITPRG - discussed by Tsioumani (n 134). 
206 UNPFII (n 163) para 27. 
207 In comparison to the Nagoya Protocol, neither the ILO Convention No 169 or UNDRIP link benefit-
sharing and traditional knowledge. CESCR, General Comment No 21 (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 
para 37, refers to prior informed consent, but not benefit-sharing, with regard to traditional knowledge. 
See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17), at 127-130; and Craig and Davies, 'Ethical Relationship for 
Biodiversity Research and Benefit-sharing with Indigenous Peoples' 2 Macquarine Journal of 
International and Comparative Environmental Law (2005) 31. 
208 CBD Decision XII/12D (2014), preambular para 4 and para 2. 
  
aimed at providing global benefits (such as advancing climate science).209 Although 
the CBD text itself does not distinguish between commercial and other utilization of 
traditional knowledge, other international legal materials expressly link benefit-
sharing to commercial use.210 The issue has been treated with extreme caution by the 
CBD COP through a voluntary "code of ethical conduct" that is not intended to 
'interpret the obligations of the CBD." 211  A systematic reading of the Nagoya 
Protocol,212 however, would rather point to an obligation to share (arguably non-
monetary) benefits arising from non-commercial research on traditional knowledge, 
including when the research is meant to contribute to the global goal of conserving 
biodiversity. The development of guidelines under the CBD may contribute to clarify 
the benefit-sharing obligations arising under the Convention and the Protocol with 
regard to different uses of traditional knowledge.213  
 
Finally, it should be noted that intra-State benefit-sharing requirements related to the 
use of natural resources and traditional knowledge have been increasingly reflected in 
the standards of international development banks,214 the requirements of international 
climate initiatives,215 and guidelines on land tenure and agricultural investment.216 A 
further conceptual aspect that remains to be teased out in this connection is the 
linkage between benefit-sharing and land tenure, including as an essential pre-
condition for the protection and preservation of traditional knowledge,217 against the 
background of the growing relevance of international human rights and investment 
treaties for land disputes.218 
 
3.4 Beneficiaries 
 
Besides reiterating that benefit-sharing targets State and/or non-State actors, it is 
difficult to derive a common core with regards to its beneficiaries. The difficulty 
derives both from the variety of activities that trigger benefit-sharing, and from the 
uneven development of sharing modalities in relation to underlying global benefits 
(and possibly the tensions between the role of ecosystem stewards and the vulnerable 
in the ecosystem services discourse). 219  It may be argued that benefit-sharing 
                                                        
209 Consider, for instance, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changeµ&OLPDWH&KDQJH
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IntergovernmeQWDO3DQHORQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶2007), at 138 and 673; and UNESCO 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), article 17. 
210 UN Convention to Combat Desertification, art 17; World Bank OP 4.10, para 19; IFC Performance 
Standard 8, para 16. 
211 Tkarihwaié:ri Code (n 124), paras 14 and 1. 
212 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a), read with Article 5 and Annex, and Articles 16-17. See Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck (n 17) at 179-184. 
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214 Eg, Inter-American Development Bank, Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples and Strategy for 
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217 Tkarihwaié:ri Code (n 124), paras 17-19; and CESCR, General Comment No 21, para 36 and 50(c). 
218 L Cotula, 'Land: Property and Sovereignty in International Law' in E Morgera and K Kulovesi (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (forth. 2015). 
219 See sections 3.1 and 1 above. 
  
primarily (albeit not exclusively) targets vulnerable beneficiaries, notably developing 
countries, indigenous peoples and local communities.  
 
It should also be noted that these conceptual difficulties add to immense practical 
challenges in the contextual identification of beneficiaries within groups (of State or 
non-State actors) that are non-homogenous and whose circumstances vary 
significantly across time and space. In that connection, the identification of 
beneficiaries and the connected risks of exclusion are tightly linked to the concerted 
and dialogic process of sharing discussed above and the purposes of realizing fairness 
and equity discussed below.  
 
3.4.1. Inter-State dimension  
 
The international treaties that include intra-State benefit-sharing obligations refer to 
beneficiaries in different terms, although they all place special emphasis on 
developing countries. Under UNCLOS, benefits should be shared with humankind 
without discrimination, but 'taking into particular consideration the interests and 
needs of developing States.'220  Similarly, the ITPGR foresees benefit-sharing with all 
parties, specifically pointing to developing countries as beneficiaries of technology 
transfer, capacity building and the allocation of commercial benefits.221 Along similar 
lines, under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, beneficiaries are the "provider 
countries" with the understanding that all countries can be both users and providers of 
genetic resources,222 but provisions on technology transfer, funding and sharing of 
biotechnological innovation specifically target developing countries.223 Once again, 
the question of whether and how benefit-sharing adds, or otherwise relates, to the 
common but differentiated responsibility principle comes to the fore. 
 
3.4.2. Intra-State dimension  
 
Both in international biodiversity and human rights law, intra-State benefit-sharing 
most clearly targets indigenous and tribal peoples as beneficiaries.224 The CBD and its 
Nagoya Protocol also refer to local communities225 - a category of unclear status in 
international human rights law226 that could apply to a variety of groups benefitting 
from the protection of human rights of general application (such as those related to 
property, subsistence and culture) that may be negatively affected by interferences 
with their customary relations with land and natural resources.227 Along similar lines, 
                                                        
220 UNLOS Arts. 140 and 160(2)(f)(i). 
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224 CBD Article 8(j); Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2) and (5); ILO Convention No 169, Article 15(2); 
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225 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 17), at 383. 
226 A Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in International Law, PhD thesis EUI, 2013; and 
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the ITPGR considers 'farmers' beneficiaries, 228  and recent international soft-law 
initiatives have expanded the beneficiaries to include 'tenure right holders' (i.e. those 
having a formal or informal right to access land and other natural resources for the 
realization of their human rights to an adequate standard of living and wellbeing)229 
and small-scale fishing communities.230 The latter, incidentally, appears to point to 
the emergence of intra-State benefit-sharing under the law of the sea.231  
 
As highlighted above with regard to benefits and triggers, the approach of 
international environmental law to intra-State benefit-sharing differs in terms of 
emphasis and rationale from that emerging under human rights law. It thus remains to 
be clarified whether in addition to applying to non-indigenous, traditional rural 
communities (be they in the North or South), intra-State benefit-sharing also applies 
to non-traditional communities that may collectively manage natural resources 
(commons232) or to individual holders of human rights (such as adequate housing, 
water and sanitation) that may be negatively affected by environmental measures.233 
In addressing these questions, it should also be kept in mind that the choice of market-
based, right-based or project-based approaches to pursue intra-State benefit-sharing 
has a bearing on the identification of beneficiaries.234  
 
 
3.5 Fairness and Equity 
 
Benefit-sharing is accompanied by the qualification "equitable" 235  or "fair and 
equitable"236  under all the treaties referring to it, with the exception of the ILO 
Convention No. 169. Nonetheless, also in that context, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have referred to equitable 
benefit-sharing.237  Consequently, former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya concluded 
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that 'there is no specific international rule that guarantees benefit-sharing for 
LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHVDVLGHIURPWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQWKDWVXFKVKDULQJPXVWEH³IDLUDQG
HTXLWDEOH´'238 It is thus argued that the rationale for the emergence of benefit-sharing 
in international law is the operationalization of equity. In other words, benefit-sharing 
should be counted among the specific principles deriving from equity as a general 
principle of international law, that serve to balance competing rights and interests239 
with a view to integrating ideas of justice into a relationship regulated by international 
law.240 The value of benefit-sharing should therefore be assessed by the same token 
used for other equitable principles - their capacity in providing 'new perspectives and 
potentially fresh solutions to tricky legal problems' to the benefit of all, not just to the 
advantage of the powerful.241  
 
International treaties containing benefit-sharing, however, leave the specific 
determination of what is fair and equitable to successive multilateral negotiations (in 
the context of multilateral benefit-sharing mechanisms) and contextual negotiations, 
including contractual ones, in the context of bilateral inter-State benefit-sharing and 
of intra-State benefit-sharing. It may thus be necessary to rely on legal theory to 
further investigate this tenet of the proposed conceptualization. Building upon 
Klager's insightful interpretation 242  of Franck's seminal work on equity in 
international law,243 it can be argued that the use of the two expressions "fair and 
equitable" serves to make explicit both procedural dimensions of justice (fairness) 
that determine the legitimacy of certain courses of action, as well as substantive 
dimensions of justice (equity).244 And while these are inextricably linked notions, they 
also point to an inherent tension: fairness supports stability within the legal system 
(predictable and clear procedures), whereas equity tends towards change (recognition 
or enhanced realization of rights, (re-) allocation of power over resources).245 This 
WHQVLRQFDQRQO\EHUHVROYHGWKURXJKD³IDLUQHVVGLVFRXUVH´- a negotiation "premised 
on the moderate scarcity of world's resources and existence of a global community 
sharing some basic perceptions of what is unconditionally unfair" and that at the very 
least allows for "meaningful scrutiny of whether or not a certain conduct is ultimately 
fair."246 Within this discourse, two substantive conditions apply for determining what 
would be unconditionally unfair. First, a no-trumping condition, whereby no 
participant can make claims that automatically prevail over the claims made by other 
participants.247 And this condition notably applies also to claims based on national 
sovereignty, thereby overriding presumptions in favour of the States.248 Second, a 
maximum condition, whereby inequalities in the substantive outcome of the discourse 
(so, the sharing of benefits) are only justifiable if they provide advantages to all 
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participants.249 In the words of Klager, therefore, the use of the expression "fair and 
equitable" is "an invitation by international law-makers to proceed by way of a 
fairness discourse based on a Socratic method."250 This resonates with the earlier 
finding that "sharing" conveys the idea of a concerted and dialogic process aimed at 
reaching consensus. 
 
It should be further emphasized that similarly to other equitable principles, fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing is open-textured and evolutionary.251 As such, while it does 
not open the door to subjective notions of justice,252 it may be filled with content by 
establishing a linkage with different international legal sub-systems (through systemic 
integration 253  or mutually supportive law-making). 254  In that connection it is 
instructive to consider the evolution of the similarly worded notion of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) in international investment law,255 for which the meaning 
of "fair and equitable" was - similarly to benefit-sharing - not clarified in the relevant 
treaties. International adjudication has instead fleshed FET out by relying on 
international human rights law notions such as procedural fairness, non-
discrimination and proportionality. 256  The incipient cross-fertilization between 
international biodiversity and human rights law in relation to benefit-sharing may, 
along similar lines, be part of a 'global discursive practice of mutual learning'257 with 
regard to equity that has not so far elicited sufficient attention across different areas of 
international law and legal scholarship.  
 
 
4. Research agenda 
 
The present analysis has provided a tool for a more systematic study of the emergence 
and evolution of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in different areas of international 
law. Taking treaty law as a basis, it has delineated a concept that could facilitate 
research across a variety of international and transnational legal materials, while 
allowing for appreciation of differences in the context of varying logics of different 
areas of international law. Fair and equitable benefit-sharing has thus been 
conceptualized as the concerted and dialogic process aimed at building partnership in 
identifying and allocating economic and non-economic benefits among State and non-
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State actors, with an emphasis on the vulnerable. Even in the context of bilateral 
exchanges, fair and equitable benefit-sharing encompasses multiple streams of 
benefits of a local and global relevance, as it aims to benefit a wider group than those 
actively or directly engaged in bioprospecting, natural resource management, 
environmental protection or use of knowledge where a heightened and cosmopolitan 
form of cooperation is sought.  
 
As a springboard for future research, this concept could suggest the need to revisit 
questions about the functions of equity in international law. In particular, it provides a 
relatively untested ground to better understand the interactions between intra-
generational equity - a relatively recent and still unsettled concept in international 
law258 - and inter-generational equity.259 It also feeds an original reflection within the 
well-established debate260 on human rights and the environment.261 The opportunities 
for cross-compliance that synergize the normative detail of international biodiversity 
law and the justiciability of international human rights are still to be critically 
assessed. As are the tensions between different premises and interpretative approaches 
in these two areas of law, including in light of SHUFHLYHG µunrealistic expectations 
regarding the conservationist behavior of indigenous peoples [that] may have 
GHWULPHQWDO FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ DQG UHVSHFW RI WKHLU ULJKWV¶262 And, as 
clearly demonstrated by the debate on IPRs, international economic law may provide 
opportunities and challenges to the realization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
both from an environmental and human rights perspective. 263  In particular, the 
growing relevance of fair and equitable benefit-sharing to natural resource use, 
including in relation to business responsibility to respect human rights, underscores 
the need to fully investigate opportunities and tensions with international investment 
law.264 
 
Finally, the proposed concept opens up for investigation the status of benefit-sharing 
in general international law. Based on its treaty formulations, it has been argued that in 
certain sectors it has developed into a customary norm.265 But across sectoral regimes, 
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it is to be clarified whether, particularly because of its flexibility, fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing is emerging as a general principle of international law that may be 
derived from converging international - rather than national - legal developments.266 If 
it is indeed evolving into a principle that may affect the exercise of States' 
discretionary powers in relation to the development, interpretation and application of 
international law in the absence of an applicable treaty basis,267 the technical and 
practical questions raised by the present conceptualization should be addressed in 
earnest.   
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